Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 663-683
• 关键词: Strategic-form game; Myopic stable set; Farsighted stable set; core

摘要

This paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form games. Our two main contributions are (i) to establish a connection between myopic stable sets and the stable matchings of an auxiliary two-sided matching problem and (ii) to identify a structural property of 2-player games, called the block partition property, which helps characterize the strategy profiles that are indirectly dominated by a fixed profile. Our analysis also generalizes and unifies existing results on myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player games. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.