Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki; Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: Shinshu University; Hosei University; Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.002
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 503-512
• 关键词: many-to-many matching; STABILITY; Observable substitutability; Size monotonicity; Cumulative offer algorithm

摘要

We examine the roles of (slightly weakened versions of) the observable substitutability condition and the observable substitutability across doctors condition of Hatfield et al. (2021) in many-to-many matching with contracts. We modify the standard cumulative offer algorithm to find stable outcomes and prove new results on the existence of stable outcomes. It is remarkable that size monotonicity at the offer-proposing side is essential for the existence result under observable substitutability across doctors. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.