Full farsighted rationality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karos, Dominik; Robles, Laura
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 409-424
• 关键词: Abstract games; farsighted stability; Expectation functions; Coalition stable equilibrium

摘要

An abstract game consists of a set of states, preferences over states, and an effectivity correspondence specifying what coalitions are allowed to replace one state by another one. Agents are called farsighted if, when deciding whether to support a coalition's move, they compare the status quo to the long term outcome following their deviation. Yet, this definition of farsightedness ignores a coalition's option to remain at the status quo allowing another coalition to move: agents are not fully farsighted. Therefore, we introduce extended expectation functions, which assign to each state a list of pairs consisting of a state and a coalition that is expected to move from the former to the latter. They endow agents with an expectation about what any deviation vis-a-vis maintaining the status quo entails. We impose three rationality axioms and provide a characterization of extended expectation functions that satisfy our axioms in terms of coalition behavior. (C) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.