Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-Jen; Unver, M. Utku
• 署名单位: Durham University; Deakin University; Boston College
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 25-43
• 关键词: Tiebreak mechanisms; Penalty shootouts; Fairness in sequential contests; mechanism design; market design; Order independence

摘要

Economists have long recognized that the effect of move order on outcomes is non-negligible in sequential contests. We study tiebreak mechanisms used in team sports and known as penalty shootouts through a dynamic model. We characterize all order-independent mechanisms where two balanced teams have equal chances to win the shootout whenever they are tied after equal numbers of attempts; thus, move order has no relevance for winning chances. In most sports, such as football and hockey, teams take penalties in a fixed order, known as ABAB, while some tournaments adopted the alternating-order variant, ABBA. We find that these and all other exogenous-order mechanisms - with one exception - are order-dependent in regular rounds. Although ABBA is order independent in sudden-death rounds, ABAB is not. Our theory supports empirical studies linking ABAB to unfair outcomes and multiple equilibria in terms of winning chances of the first- vs. second-kicking teams in different football traditions. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.