Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Syropoulos, Constantinos
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; Drexel University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 148-178
• 关键词: Disputes; Output insecurity; Destructive wars; Peaceful settlement; Unarmed peace

摘要

On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not necessarily, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, ex ante resource transfers without commitments can improve the prospects for peace, but only when the configuration of parameters describing the degree of output security and the degree of war's destruction ensures the possibility of peace without such transfers at least for some sufficiently even initial resource distributions. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).