Screening by mode of trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beccuti, Juan; Moeller, Marc
• 署名单位: University of Bern
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.010
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 400-420
• 关键词: Durable goods; dynamic mechanism design; Short-term commitment; ratchet effect; screening

摘要

This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment, by allowing for contracts that determine the good's allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period. We show that the revenue-maximizing menu of contracts features screening by mode of trade when future trade is subject to frictions and the monopolist is more patient than consumers. Selling to high types while renting to low types, allows the monopolist to defer part of his compensation in form of a reduction of consumers' future information rents while lowering the allocational costs of ordinary, intertemporal screening. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.