Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ahmad, Ghufran
• 署名单位: National University of Sciences & Technology - Pakistan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 136-162
• 关键词: Housing market; incentive compatibility; top trading cycles; Weak preferences

摘要

I consider the housing market problem with weak preferences. In this context, I provide a sufficient condition for weak group strategy proofness; no group of agents can jointly misreport their preferences such that each agent in the group becomes better-off. Using this sufficient condition, I prove that the top trading absorbing sets, top cycles, and highest priority objectrules satisfy weak group strategy proofness. Thus, this paper establishes that it is possible to achieve weak group strategy proofness, along with other desirable results, for the housing market problem with weak preferences even though group strategy proofnessis incompatible with Pareto efficiencyin this setting. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.