Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vida, Peter; Honryo, Takakazu
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Universite Bourgogne Europe; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Doshisha University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 102-112
• 关键词: Multi-sender signaling; Unprejudiced beliefs; Strategic stability; forward induction

摘要

The concept of unprejudiced beliefs equilibrium is simple: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be consistent with the principle that multiple deviations are infinitely less likely than single deviations. Our questions are: does there always exist such an equilibrium and what can be done if there are multiple such equilibria? To select a unique equilibrium, this notion is usually coupled with the intuitive criterion. The simultaneous usage of these concepts is ad hoc, unjustified, and again might eliminate all the equilibria. We show that coupling these notions is legitimate, as both are implied by strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)), hence a desired equilibrium always exists. The intuitive criterion is trivially implied by stability. We show that in generic multi-sender signaling games stable outcomes can be supported with unprejudiced beliefs. It follows by forward induction that stable sets contain an equilibrium which is unprejudiced and intuitive at the same time. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.