Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yi-Chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University; University of International Business & Economics; University of California System; University of California Riverside
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.001
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 181-197
• 关键词: Complete information; Continuous implementation; implementation; information perturbations; Maskin monotonicity*; rationalizability; social choice function

摘要

We prove that the Maskin monotonicity* condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfers are made in any rationalizable profile; the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012). (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.