Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Collins, Sean M.; James, Duncan; Servatka, Maros; Vadovic, Radovan
• 署名单位: Fordham University; Fordham University; Macquarie University; University of Economics Bratislava; Carleton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.001
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 94-106
• 关键词: Posted offer; Advance production; Market entry game; Marshallian path adjustment; equilibration

摘要

We examine equilibration in a market where Marshallian path adjustment can be enforced, or not, as a treatment: a posted offer market either with buyer queueing via value order, or random order, respectively. We derive equilibrium predictions, and run experiments crossing queueing rules with either human or deterministically optimizing robot buyers under both locally stationary and non-stationary marginal cost. Results on rate of convergence to competitive equilibrium are obtained, and Marshallian path adjustment is established as conducive to attaining competitive equilibrium. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.