Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
• 署名单位: Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 126-142
• 关键词: Payoff sampling; Best experienced payoff; Procedural rationality; Asymptotically stable sets; Closed under payoff sampling

摘要

We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches -i.e., a battery of tests-, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics).In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game.(c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.