Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chakraborty, Anujit
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.002
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 105-132
• 关键词: Experimental economics; Finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma; Behavioral game theory

摘要

This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare three behavioral theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The three theories fuse reputational cooperation (a la Kreps et al. (1982)) with the following three non-selfish motives respectively: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious about cooperation (Duty), and enjoying social-efficiency (Efficiency-Seeking). We use reputational cooperation under purely Selfish preferences as a fourth theory. Our experimental design varies the decline-rate of future rewards, under which these theories predict rich patterns of behavior. Based on a Finite Mixture Model, the data is best explained if the modal subject types are Selfish and Efficiency-Seeking: We estimate that 40-49% of our subjects are Selfish, 36-45% are Efficiency-seeking, and 6-20% are Altruistic. We find little evidence for Duty players.Published by Elsevier Inc.