Delegation and threat in bargaining
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Segendorff, B
署名单位：
Stockholm School of Economics
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0611
发表日期：
1998
页码：
266-283
关键词：
摘要：
Two principals (nations) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy. (C) 1998 Academic Press.