An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Oechssler, J
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0550
发表日期：
1997
页码：
203-237
关键词：
摘要：
A convincing interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria describes them as steady states in a large population in which players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. I study the conditions under which an evolutionary, stochastic learning process converges to the appropriate distribution over pure strategies in the population. I find that not all mixed equilibria can be justified as the result of an evolutionary process even if the equilibrium is unique. For symmetric 2 x 2 and 3 x 3 games I give necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence, which are related to the concept of an ESS, and for n x n games I give a sufficient condition. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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