Evolutionary stability of pure-strategy equilibria in finite games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Somanathan, E
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0533
发表日期：
1997
页码：
253-265
关键词：
摘要：
Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be (Lyapunov) stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibria are also stable. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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