Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Laussel, D; Le Breton, M
署名单位：
Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0637
发表日期：
1998
页码：
194-218
关键词：
摘要：
A private, profit-maximizing firm produces a public good that enters the utility functions of several users. Each of them separately designs and proposes to the firm a contract specifying a transfer payment as a function of the amount of public good supplied. The firm has to accept or to refuse each contract before knowing the realized value of a random variable that enters its cost function. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and explore some refinements ruling out Pareto inefficient equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41. (C) 1998 Academic Press.