An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Feinberg, Y
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0614
发表日期：
1998
页码：
2-9
关键词：
摘要：
Aumann and Myerson (1988) defined a noncooperative linking game leading to the formation of cooperation structures. They asked whether it is possible for a simple game to have a stable structure in which no coalition forms, i.e., in which the cooperation graph is not internally complete but is connected and stable. We answer this question affirmatively; specifically, we present a simple proper weighted majority game with a connected incomplete structure, and we prove it to be stable under any protocol for the strategic formation of new links. This result implies that strategically refused communication can be a robust stable phenomena. (C) 1998 Academic Press.