Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirkegaard, Ren; Overgaard, Per Baltzer
• 署名单位: Aarhus University; Brock University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 145-165
• 关键词: first-price and second-price auctions; Asymmetric bidders; pre-auction offers

摘要

We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work because they move the assignment when bidder valuations are near the top closer to the optimal, revenue-maximizing assignment. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.