Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Fudenberg, Drew; Takahashi, Satoru
署名单位：
Princeton University; Harvard University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014
发表日期：
2011
页码：
100-120
关键词：
摘要：
Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.