Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bulo, Samuel Rota; Bomze, Immanuel M.
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.004
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 193-211
• 关键词: Revision protocol; evolutionary stability; equilibrium selection; Fictitious play; Replicator dynamics; Best response; Learning population games

摘要

Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (INFIMMDYN), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original mass action idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, INFIMMDYN exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other popular procedures like Fictitious Play and Replicator Dynamics. We establish even support separation of INFIMMDYN in finite time, which can never be achieved by any interior-point method like those mentioned above. In fact, this property has not yet been established for any other evolutionary game dynamics. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.