Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Comino, Stefano; Manenti, Fabio M.; Nicolo, Antonio
• 署名单位: University of Udine; University of Padua
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.007
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 388-401
• 关键词: sequential innovation; patents; Licensing; intellectual property; information acquisition

摘要

The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing - namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment - in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the possibilities of restoring the R&D incentives by setting the licensing terms appropriately are severely limited. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.