Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mazali, Rogerio; Rodrigues-Neto, Jose A.
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.009
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 103-131
• 关键词: brand; COMPETITION; free entry; matching; monopoly; signaling; status; tax; welfare

摘要

We analyzed the market for indivisible, pure status goods. Firms produce and sell different brands of pure status goods to a population that is willing to signal individual abilities to potential matches in another population. Individual status is determined by the most expensive status good one has. There is a stratified equilibrium with a finite number of brands. Under constant tax rates, a monopoly sells different brands to social classes of equal measure, while in contestable markets, social classes have decreasing measures. Under optimal taxation, contestable markets have progressive tax rates, while a monopoly faces an adequate flat tax rate to all brands. In contrast with extant literature, subsidies may be socially optimal, depending on the parameters, in both market structures. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.