A dynamic school choice model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sebastian Pereyra, Juan
• 署名单位: Colegio de Mexico
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.011
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 100-114
• 关键词: School choice; Overlapping agents; dynamic matching; deferred acceptance algorithm

摘要

This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their current positions or choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a solution always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamically strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.