Why can't a woman bid more like a man?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yan; Katuscak, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 181-213
• 关键词: gender; Menstrual cycle; Contraceptive pills; auction; experiment

摘要

We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.