Reselling information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ali, S. Nageeb; Chen-Zion, Ayal; Lillethun, Erik
署名单位：
Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Colgate University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.015
发表日期：
2024
页码：
23-43
关键词：
摘要：
Information can be simultaneously consumed, replicated, and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. Even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer in any Markovian equilibrium: in the frequent-offer limit, her payoffs converge to 0 once a single buyer buys information. By contrast, there exists a non-Markovian prepay equilibrium where payment is extracted from most buyers before information is sold. This prepay equilibrium exploits buyers' ability to resell information and results in the seller achieving (approximately) the same payoff that she would were resale prohibited.
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