Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gallo, Oihane; Klaus, Bettina
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.011
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 485-516
• 关键词: Claims problems; coalition formation; Stable partitions

摘要

We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size theta is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) theta-size coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable partition formed by (mostly) theta-size coalitions.