Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guo, Huiyi
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.016
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 263-284
• 关键词: Collusion-proofness; Multiple coalitions; full surplus extraction; Bayesian mechanism; Ambiguous mechanism

摘要

The paper examines information structures that can guarantee full surplus extraction via collusion -proof mechanisms. Our collusion-proofness notion requires that there does not exist any coalition whose manipulation can affect the mechanism designer's payoff. When the mechanism designer is restricted to using standard Bayesian mechanisms, we show that under almost every prior distribution of agents' types, there exist payoff structures under which there is no collusionproof full surplus extracting mechanism. However, when ambiguous mechanisms are allowed, we provide a weak necessary and sufficient condition on the prior such that collusion -proof full surplus extraction can be guaranteed. Thus, the paper sheds light on how the collusion-proofness requirement resolves the full surplus extraction paradox of Cr & eacute;mer and McLean (1985, 1988) and how engineering ambiguity in mechanism rules restores the paradox.