Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: You, Jung S.
• 署名单位: California State University System; California State University East Bay
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 166-190
• 关键词: VCG mechanisms; Worst-case analysis; individual rationality; Asymptotic budget balance

摘要

For the problem of assigning economic bads (for example, costly tasks or undesirable objects), Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms achieve efficient allocations via money transfers. However, they can produce arbitrarily large budget surpluses or deficits. We construct a performance index for a VCG mechanism to measure its budget surplus and deficit in the worst-case. Using this index, we develop mechanisms whose surpluses or deficits vanish as the number of participants increases, for both cases of bads and goods. We find that individual rationality creates an asymmetry between surplus and deficit, particularly in the case of bads. When the number of agents is large enough, a minute amount of deficit can replace unit surplus to achieve a budget balance. For the case of economic goods, unit surplus can only be replaced with unit deficit, regardless of individual rationality. This result shows that the model with bads differs fundamentally from the model with goods. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.