Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Parravano, Melanie; Poulsen, Odile
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 191-199
• 关键词: coordination; Stake size; Payoff asymmetry; labels; Focal point

摘要

We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford et al. (2008). These findings suggest that players' mode of reasoning, and the extent to which it can be explained by team reasoning or a level-k model, crucially depends on the symmetry or asymmetry of the coordination payoffs. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).