On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yoon, Kiho
• 署名单位: Korea University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 206-213
• 关键词: The dynamic pivot mechanism; dynamic mechanism design; budget balance; VCG mechanism; Bilateral trading

摘要

We modify the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Valimaki (Econometrica, 2010) in such a way that lump-sum fees are collected from the players. We show that the modified mechanism satisfies ex-ante budget balance as well as ex-post efficiency, periodic ex-post incentive compatibility, and periodic ex-post individual rationality, as long as the Markov chain representing the evolution of players' private information is irreducible and aperiodic and players are sufficiently patient. We also show that the diverse preference assumption of Bergemann and Valimaki may preclude budget balance. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.