Invariance to representation of information

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Yildiz, Muhamet
署名单位:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
刊物名称:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN:
0899-8256
DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.004
发表日期:
2015
页码:
142-156
关键词:
Invariant selection Invariance equilibrium universal type space
摘要:
Under weak assumptions on the solution concept, I construct an invariant selection across all finite type spaces, in which the types with identical information play the same action. Along the way, I establish an interesting lattice structure for finite type spaces and construct an equilibrium on the space of all finite types. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.