Plausible cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.010
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 45-59
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring; bounded rationality; COOPERATION

摘要

There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of the earlier literature assumes public monitoring. Departures from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players' observations may dramatically complicate coordination and the provision of incentives, with the consequence that equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex or fragile. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system - a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.