Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuang, Zhonghong; Zhao, Hangcheng; Zheng, Jie
• 署名单位: Renmin University of China; University of Pennsylvania; Shandong University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.009
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 218-243
• 关键词: Type Correlation; Bayesian persuasion; information design; All-Pay Auction Contest; information disclosure; Ridge Distribution

摘要

Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants' total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a signal that solely generates ridge distributions as posteriors.