Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mankat, Fabian
• 署名单位: Universitat Kassel
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.006
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-26
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; COOPERATION; NORMS

摘要

This paper studies how a continuum of individuals interacting in a binary public goods game can secure cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. The evolutionary model consists of three distinct dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. In line with the indirect approach proposed by G & uuml;th and Yaari (1992), behavior results from utility maximization, while norms and approval preferences evolve over time. The underlying evolutionary processes differ concerning speed and nature. Whereas norms evolve at the cultural level through peer interactions and socialization, approval preferences are (at least partly) biologically inherited and transmitted from parents to their offspring. We find that if cultural and biological reproductive fitnesses are derived from material and social factors, then an interplay of social disapproval mechanisms gives rise to stable equilibria in which positive cooperation levels persist. Moreover, we find stable equilibria characterized by heterogeneous behavior and moral attitudes across individuals.