Order independence for rationalizability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manili, Julien
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.013
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 152-160
• 关键词: Rationalizability; Order independence; Iterated elimination procedure; game theory

摘要

This paper provides a sufficient monotonicity condition for the solution of a rationalizability procedure to be independent of the order of elimination. The analysis unfolds in an abstract environment that applies to any game and elimination procedure. Monotonicity is satisfied by rationalizability procedures based on monotone belief operators, such as directed rationalizability, interim correlated rationalizability, or, in sequential games, initial and backwards rationalizability.