Collective action: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Victoria Anauati, Maria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastian; Torrens, Gustavo
• 署名单位: Universidad de San Andres Argentina; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 36-55
• 关键词: collective action; multiple equilibria; laboratory experiment

摘要

We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows us to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a belief effect and a range of cooperation effect. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.