Giving in to social pressure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Name-Correa, Alvaro J.; Yildirim, Huseyin
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Duke University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.006
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 99-116
• 关键词: Altruism; Social pressure; Fundraising; Charitable giving

摘要

We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social norm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism givers fare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donor welfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision of the public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts a light-handed regulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their exemption from the popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show that contrary to pure altruism, a more equal income distribution may produce more of the public good. In fundraising campaigns where a social norm is not apparent, one may emerge endogenously if donors are not too heterogeneous. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.