Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cho, Wonki Jo
• 署名单位: Sogang University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 168-177
• 关键词: Ordinal mechanism; strategy-proofness; Adjacent strategy-proofness; Mistake monotonicity

摘要

We study three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms: (i) strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by misrepresenting his preferences; (ii) adjacent strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by switching the rankings of two adjacent alternatives; and (iii) mistake monotonicity, which requires that the welfare of each agent weakly decrease as he reports increasingly bigger mistakes. Each of these properties has three versions, depending on whether preferences over sure alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries by the stochastic dominance, downward lexicographic, or upward lexicographic extension. We identify conditions on the preference domain that guarantee the equivalence of these properties. The universal domain and the domains of single dipped and single-peaked preferences satisfy our conditions. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.