Median stable matchings in two-sided markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 64-69
• 关键词: Median stable matchings; Many-to-one matching with wages; many-to-many matching; matching with contracts; Strong substitutability; The law of aggregate demand

摘要

We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.