Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cardella, Eric; Depew, Briggs
• 署名单位: Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 182-202
• 关键词: Ratchet effect; Output restriction; Piece-rate pay; Real-effort task; learning-by-doing

摘要

The ratchet effect is a phenomenon where workers strategically restrict their output because they anticipate high levels of productivity will be met with increased expectations in the future. Using a real-effort work task and a piece-rate incentive scheme, we investigate the presence of the ratchet effect using two different methods for evaluating worker productivity: (i) when productivity is evaluated individually, and (ii) when productivity is evaluated collectively among a group of workers. We find strong evidence that workers restrict output when productivity is evaluated individually. However, we find little evidence of output restriction when productivity is evaluated at the group level, which we attribute to the coordination problem and the free-riding incentive that emerge within the group. Although, output restriction re-emerges if workers are able to communicate. We also examine an important dynamic implication of the ratchet effect, and our results indicate that output restriction reduces future productivity through reduced learning-by-doing. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.