Cognitive ability and games of school choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; University of Milano-Bicocca
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 156-183
• 关键词: Laboratory experiment; school choice; strategy-proofness; Cognitive ability; mechanism design

摘要

We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this to be the case: lower ability participants receive lower payoffs and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences are reduced, and ability distributions across schools harmonized. Hence, we find support for the argument that a strategy-proof mechanism levels the playing field. Finally, we document a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that average payoffs are larger under Immediate than under Deferred Acceptance. (C) 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.