Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van den Brink, Rene; He, Simin; Huang, Jia-Ping
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shenzhen University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 182-205
• 关键词: Polluted river; cost sharing; Axiomatization; Permission values

摘要

When a polluted river passes through several different regions, a challenging question is how should the costs for cleaning the river be shared among the regions. Following Ni and Wang (2007) and Dong et al. (2012), we first show that the Upstream Equal Sharing method and the Downstream Equal Sharing method coincide with the conjunctive permission value (van den Brink and Gilles, 1996) of an associated game with a permission structure, which is obtained as the Shapley value of an associated restricted game. Two main advantages of this approach are (i) we obtain new axiomatizations of the two sharing methods based on axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value, and (ii) by applying the alternative disjunctive permission value, obtained as the Shapley value of a different restricted game, we propose the new Upstream Limited Sharing method and provide an axiomatization. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.