Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hellman, Ziv; Peretz, Ron
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 22-36
• 关键词: Shapley value; Network games

摘要

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting 'graph value' (and 'S-value' in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.