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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Oxford; Basque Foundation for Science; University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper, we propose a novel way to measure behavioral heterogeneity in a population of stochastic individuals. Our measure is choice-based; it evaluates the probability that, over a randomly selected menu, the sampled choices of two sampled individuals differ. We provide axiomatic foundations for this measure and a decomposition result that separates heterogeneity into its intrapersonal and interpersonal components. (JEL D01, D11, D91)
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Hinnosaar, Toomas; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); University of Nottingham
摘要：We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to...
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作者：Correa, Sofia
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn't concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a veteran reward. Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which ...
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作者：Hua, Xinyu; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Should platforms be liable for harms suffered by users? A platform enables interactions between firms and users. Harmful firms impose larger costs on users than safe firms. If firms have deep pockets and are fully liable for harms, platform liability is unnecessary. If firms have limited liability, holding platforms liable for residual harm increases platforms' incentives to raise interaction prices and invest in auditing to deter, detect, and block harmful firms. The social desirability and o...
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作者：Ganglmair, Bernhard; Simcoe, Timothy; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：Using data from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a voluntary organization that develops protocols for managing internet infrastructure, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to continue or abandon a line of research. The model's key parameters measure the speed at which authors learn whether their project will become a technology standard. We use the model to simulate two innovation policies: an R&D subsidy and a publication prize. While subsidies have a larger...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Backward induction (BI) is only defined for perfect information games, but its logic is also invoked in many concepts for imperfect or incomplete information games. Yet, the meaning of BI reasoning is not clear in these settings, and we lack a way to capture the essence of BI without assuming equilibrium. We introduce backward rationalizability, a nonequilibrium solution concept for incomplete information games, which we argue distills the logic of BI reasoning. We show several of its properti...
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an ordeal-that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lump-sum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity h...
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作者：Newham, Melissa; Seldeslachts, Jo; Banal-Estanol, Albert
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; KU Leuven; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Amsterdam; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：Common ownership-where several firms are (partially) owned by the same investors-and its impact on product market competition has recently drawn much attention. This paper focuses on its implications for market entry. We consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets that are opened up by the end of regulatory protection and which were previously dominated by a single firm selling the brand name drug. We find robust evidence that an increase in common ownership ...
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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Wong, Michael B.; Zhang, Allen T.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the role of endogenous trust in amplifying ideological bias. Agents in our model learn a sequence of states from sources whose accuracy is ex ante uncertain. Agents learn these accuracies by comparing their own reasoning about the states based on introspection or direct experience to the sources' reports. Small biases in this reasoning can cause large ideological differences in the agents' trust in information sources and their beliefs about the states, and may lead agents to become o...
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作者：Wilson, Kyle
作者单位：Pomona College; Claremont Colleges; Pomona College
摘要：Government infrastructure investment may crowd out investment from private firms or induce them to invest preemptively. The tension between these effects underlies the policy debate over municipal provision of internet access. I estimate demand for broadband and combine these results with a dynamic oligopoly model of private and public firms' entry and investment decisions. I simulate a ban on public entry and find that municipalities crowd out more private fiber-optic investment than they ind...
