Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newham, Melissa; Seldeslachts, Jo; Banal-Estanol, Albert
• 署名单位: Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; KU Leuven; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Amsterdam; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220220
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: GENERIC ENTRY; COMPETITION; FIRMS; POWER

摘要

Common ownership-where several firms are (partially) owned by the same investors-and its impact on product market competition has recently drawn much attention. This paper focuses on its implications for market entry. We consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets that are opened up by the end of regulatory protection and which were previously dominated by a single firm selling the brand name drug. We find robust evidence that an increase in common ownership leads to a significant reduction in generic entry. (JEL D22, G32, L13, L51, L65, M31)