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作者：Schmidt, Patrick
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Preferences for mixing can reveal ambiguity perception and attitude on a single event. The validity of the approach is discussed for multiple preference classes, including maxmin, maxmax, variational, and smooth second-order preferences. An experimental implementation suggests that participants perceive almost as much ambiguity for the stock index and actions of other participants as they do for the Ellsberg urn, indicating the importance of ambiguity in real-world decision-making. (JEL C72, D...
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作者：Grochulski, Borys; Wong, Russell; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the incentive role of severance compensation. In a canonical principal-agent model, we introduce exogenous job destruction risk and show that compensation following job destruction can reduce overall incentive costs. To mitigate the risk of inefficient endogenous termination, agents with low continuation value receive no severance and lose value at job destruction, while agents with high continuation value receive high severance and gain value at job destruction. Comparative statics o...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger; Xu, Yingqi
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We examine the dynamic connections between local wealth inequality and the local politics of property rights. A jurisdiction comprises a politically dominant in-group and a marginalized out-group. At each date, the jurisdiction exploits weaknesses in due process rights under the legal system to redistribute property claims away from the out-group and toward the in-group. It combines takings and zoning with the leveraging of public assets to deter legal challenges. This leverage varies over tim...
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作者：Shirakawa, Ryo
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choice, this paper proposes that mechanisms ought to be immune only to certain simple misreports. While no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, we find one under our weaker requirement: Kesten's (2010...
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作者：Alviarez, Vanessa; Head, Keith; Mayer, Thierry
作者单位：Inter-American Development Bank; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); European Central Bank; Bank of France; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Large beer and spirits makers expanded abroad mainly by acquiring local brands. Exploiting market share data in 76 countries and changes in brand ownership from 2007 to 2018, we estimate that owners matter little for brand performance, except via a negative consumer response to foreign ownership. Counterfactuals indicate that market power increases were large enough to yield higher profits for most mergers without relying on fixed-cost savings. Emulating procompetition policies used by the Uni...
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作者：Horn, Samantha; Loewenstein, George
作者单位：University of Chicago; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Many economic decisions, such as whether to invest in developing new skills, change professions, or purchase a technology, benefit from accurate estimation of skill acquisition. We examine the accuracy of such predictions by having study participants predict the speed at which they will master unfamiliar tasks. Across three studies involving two types of tasks and two levels of difficulty, we find systematic underestimation of learning, even after receiving feedback. In a fourth study, partici...
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作者：Mimra, Wanda; Waibel, Christian
作者单位：heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
摘要：This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the role of contracting environments on market outcomes and efficiency in markets with hidden information using experimental methods. When markets are plagued by hidden information, competition does not necessarily ensure efficient market outcomes. This crucially depends on the nature of the hidden information. We present a parsimonious experimental design that serves to compare the different contracting environments for both types of hidden...
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作者：Hara, Chiaki; Mukerji, Sujoy; Riedel, Frank; Tallon, Jean-Marc
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bielefeld; University of Johannesburg; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper examines efficient allocations in economies where consumers exhibit heterogeneous smooth ambiguity preferences and face model uncertainty with a common set of identifiable models. Aggregate endowment is ambiguous. We characterize economies where the representative consumer is of the smooth ambiguity type and derive efficient sharing rules. Heterogeneous ambiguity aversion leads to sharing rules that systematically differ from those in vNM economies. The representative consumer's amb...
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作者：Vives, Xavier; Vravosinos, Orestis
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University
摘要：We examine the effects of overlapping ownership among existing firms deciding whether to enter a product market. We show that in most cases-and especially when overlapping ownership is already widespread-an increase in the extent of overlapping ownership will harm welfare by softening product market competition, reducing entry, and thereby (in contrast to standard results) inducing insufficient entry and magnifying the negative impact of an increase of entry costs on entry. Overlapping ownersh...
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作者：Mackay, Alexander; Miller, Nathan h.
作者单位：University of Virginia; Georgetown University
摘要：We consider the identification of empirical models of supply and demand with imperfect competition. We show that a restriction on the covariance between unobserved demand and cost shocks can resolve endogeneity and identify the price parameter. We demonstrate how to employ this approach in estimation, and we compare it to the method of instrumental variables. Our formal results also indicate that weaker covariance restrictions can bound the price parameter. We illustrate the covariance restric...
