Persistent Protests†

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Correa, Sofia
• 署名单位: Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220191
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: emotions; MODEL

摘要

A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn't concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a veteran reward. Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which the government concedes with some density and citizens continuously drop out. The set of equilibria is fully described by the peak time. (JEL D11, D72, D74)