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作者：Corbi, Raphael; Sanches, Fabio Miessi
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study the effects of church tax exemptions on the structure of religious markets. Using the Brazilian experience as a showcase, we develop and estimate a dynamic entry model of religious organizations based on temple opening and closure in geographically isolated markets. Counterfactual simulations suggest that tax exemptions stimulated entry by all religions, but disproportionately benefited evangelical denominations: The evangelical share of temples increased by approximately 20 percentag...
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作者：Harris, Adam; Nguyen, Thi mai anh
作者单位：Cornell University; New York University
摘要：This paper provides evidence on the scope and incentive mechanisms of long-term relationships in the US truckload freight industry. In this setting, shippers and carriers engage in repeated interactions under fixed-rate contracts that allow for inefficient opportunism. The main dynamic mechanism involves shippers using the threat of relationship termination to deter carriers from short-term opportunism. This threat and the potential of future rents induce more carrier cooperation. We test this...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Nottingham
摘要：A monopolistic seller possesses an inventory containing distinct products, each consumer wishes to buy a single product, and the seller can steer consumers' choices. We fully characterize the producer-consumer surplus pairs induced by market segmentation when the number of products is large. The same characterization holds if the seller cannot price discriminate. We also investigate the relationship between consumer surplus, social welfare, and consumer privacy. Along the Pareto frontier, poin...
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作者：Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We introduce a new type of games, called opportunity-hunting games, in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (opportunity) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free ri...
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作者：Chen, Chia-Hui; Chen, Kong-Pin; Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：Kyoto University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; University of Osaka
摘要：Rating systems, widely used in online transactions, often reduce buyers' diverse opinions to summary statistics. To explore the consequences of this coarse aggregation, we analyze a dynamic adverse selection model where buyers share anonymous evaluations via a rating system. With heterogeneous buyers, the seller is tempted to secretly lower prices to attract favorable ratings from price-sensitive buyers. That leads to sporadic flash sales. The seller's incentive to manipulate ratings is, howev...
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作者：Reshidi, Pellumb; Thereze, Joao; Zhang, Mu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Duke University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study asymptotic learning when the decision-maker faces ambiguity in the precision of her information sources. She aims to estimate a state and evaluates outcomes according to the worst-case scenario. Under prior-by-prior updating, we characterize the set of asymptotic posteriors the decision-maker entertains, which consists of a continuum of degenerate distributions over an interval. Moreover, her asymptotic estimate of the state is generically incorrect. We show that even a small amount o...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper studies dynamic incentive pay in teams where agents' efforts are perfect substitutes. It shows that the principal may unequally reward identical agents to mitigate dynamic free riding in the form of procrastination. Unequal pay effectively creates a team leader who overworks and symmetric followers who underwork. Such leader-follower teams emerge if (i) agents are relatively patient or few, or (ii) the principal sufficiently cares about or is not patient for project success. These f...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a...
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作者：Ebert, Sebastian; Koster, Mats
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Penny-picking refers to the often-observed phenomenon of repeatedly taking negatively skewed risks and seems directly at odds with evidence on (positive-) skewness-seeking as observed in static settings. We show that penny-picking may not only occur despite skewness-seeking, but-seemingly paradoxically-because of skewness-seeking. With sufficient time available, risks with arbitrary negative skewness can be gambled in such a way that, overall, skewness is positive. Therefore, classical behavio...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the role of information in Bertrand competition with differentiated goods and heterogeneous production costs. When producers know their costs and consumers know their values, consumer surplus and total surplus are aligned, in the sense that the information and equilibrium that maximize consumer surplus also maximize total surplus. Alignment may fail if consumers do not know their values: Partial information about values makes purchases less efficient but intensifies price competition....
