The Limits of Limited Commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bizzotto, Jacopo; Hinnosaar, Toomas; Vigier, Adrien
• 署名单位: Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240310
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Discretion; rules; games; nash

摘要

We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and characterize the commitment structures leading to consumer-and producer-optimal outcomes. (JEL C72, D43)