Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Catonini, Emiliano; Penta, Antonio
• 署名单位: New York University; NYU Shanghai; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240361
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Rationalizability; STABILITY; implementation; dominance; belief

摘要

Backward induction (BI) is only defined for perfect information games, but its logic is also invoked in many concepts for imperfect or incomplete information games. Yet, the meaning of BI reasoning is not clear in these settings, and we lack a way to capture the essence of BI without assuming equilibrium. We introduce backward rationalizability, a nonequilibrium solution concept for incomplete information games, which we argue distills the logic of BI reasoning. We show several of its properties and discuss a few applications, including a new version of Lipnowski and Sadler's (2019) peer-confirming equilibrium. (JEL C72, C73, D83)